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TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION 
IN CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE: 
PROPOSALS FOR MODERNIZING 
CAFTA-DR 
Julia E. Johnson 
“Free trade, far from protectionism, is the path that we 
should take to make Latin America a thriving actor in the global 
economy.” – Enrique Pena Nieto 
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INTRODUCTION 
To the surprise of many, the Trump Administration has 
signaled its intent to renegotiate the Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).1  Why is 
the possible renegotiation of CAFTA-DR a surprise?  CAFTA-DR 
has been largely favorable to the United States (U.S.)—the U.S. 
has enjoyed significant trade surpluses with CAFTA-DR 
countries since its ratification.2  CAFTA-DR has also promoted 
regional integration and co-production in Central America.3  
Trade flows in and out of Central America have increased 
significantly.4  On balance, CAFTA-DR has benefitted all 
signatory nations from a trade standpoint, though it has left 
unaddressed a myriad of social, humanitarian, and governance 
issues.  Consequently, as CAFTA-DR is renegotiated, U.S. 
policymakers can build upon these successes and also make sure 
to take particular care to shore up certain aspects that CAFTA-
DR, in its current form, has fallen short.  Of note, CAFTA-DR 
does not incentivize or mandate efforts to improve labor 
conditions in Central America, leaving millions of Central 
Americans facing sub-par working conditions and low pay.5  
CAFTA-DR has also been inept to address environmental 
externalities associated with increased economic development, 
particularly in the manufacturing and natural resources sectors, 
which often pollute or cause environmental harms as part of 
their operations.6  Further, CAFTA-DR, like other regional trade 
                                                          
1  The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, Aug. 2, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 [hereinafter 
CAFTA-DR]. 
2  See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP., CAFTA-DR (DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA FTA), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2019) [hereinafter USTR] (stating that the U.S. goods trade 
surplus with CAFTA-DR countries was $ 7 billion in 2018). 
3  J. F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42468, THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA-
DR): DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 6 (2012). 
4  PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34027, HONDURAS: 
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS (2019). 
5  MAUREEN TAFT-MORALES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42580, GUATEMALA: 
POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND U.S. RELATIONS 26–27 (2019).  
6  See Otto T. Solbrig, The Environmental Agenda in Latin America: The 
Issue of the 21st Century, REVISTA, 
3
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agreements, has not fostered coalitions that were previously 
associated with multilateral trade agreements—preventing 
unification on key issues affecting trade flows, and preventing a 
cohesive response to social and environmental concerns.7 
 
This article will first review the economic, political, and 
social conditions in countries that have ratified CAFTA-DR.  The 
article then considers CAFTA-DR’s provisions and how these 
provisions build upon previous efforts at regional integration in 
Central America.  This article will subsequently analyze how 
CAFTA-DR has changed both regional and intercontinental 
trade relationships in Central America, as well as how CAFTA-
DR fits within broader trends in regional trade facilitation.  
Finally, this article will postulate certain proposals to modernize 
and improve CAFTA-DR as its terms are renegotiated in the 
coming years. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The CAFTA-DR Region. 
Before delving into the nuances of CAFTA-DR, a general 
understanding of its member states is necessary.  Along with the 
United States, the Central American nations of Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Dominican 
Republic are members of the trade agreement.  Each of these 
nations will be briefly discussed in turn. 
1. Guatemala 
Guatemala is a nation in Central America that has a 
population of roughly 16.91 million people.8  Guatemala has 
been particularly befallen by civil wars and turmoil; the country 
faced a 36-year internal war between 1960 and 1996.9  Facing 
high rates of violence and poverty,10 the country has been unable 
to halt drug trafficking due to high levels of corruption amongst 
                                                          
https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/environmental-agenda-latin-america 
(describing environmental challenges faced by Central American nations). 
7  See discussion infra Section E. 
8  TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5, at 1.  
9  Id. at 2.  
10  Id. at 2–3. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/3
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its government leaders.11  
 
Guatemala has taken strides toward democracy and elected 
governance, installing its first democratic government in 1986.12  
Despite economic poverty and insecurity, the country retains 
Central America’s largest economy and has seen increased 
economic growth in recent years.13  Guatemala’s economic 
growth rate peaked at a high of approximately 3.2% in 2018-19, 
but is expected to slightly decline until 2022.14  Unfortunately, 
strong economic growth in the private sector has not materially 
raised living conditions for citizens.  Among other research 
groups and international institutions, the World Bank has 
emphasized that Guatemala needs to improve living conditions 
in the country through additional public investment spending.15  
The U.S. and Guatemala have traditionally had a strong 
relationship; however, this relationship has become tense in 
recent years due to civil turmoil in the country, as well as 
violations of international human rights laws.16  Guatemala has 
sought amnesty for its human rights violations, which has 
largely been opposed by the international community.17  The 
U.S. continues to provide bilateral assistance to Guatemala, 
which assists with improving the country’s economic and social 
conditions, as well as addressing security issues that Guatemala 
is not equipped to fight.18  As part of these initiatives, the U.S. 
created its Strategy for Engagement in Central America to 
promote living conditions and enhance economic development in 
the region, of which Guatemala remains a key recipient of 
funding.19 
 
Although largely rejected by Congress, the Trump 
Administration has sought to substantially cut aid to 
                                                          
11  Id. at 3. 
12  Id. at 2. 
13  Id. at 15. 
14  TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5 (Summary).  
15  TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5, at 16. 
16  TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5 (Summary).  
17  Id. (“Bills introduced in the 116th Congress regarding Guatemala 
address immigration, order security, corruption and other governance issues, 
and include H.Res. 18, H.R. 1630, and S. 716.”). 
18  TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5, at 20–22. 
19  Id. 
5
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Guatemala.20  In March 2019, the Trump Administration also 
took action to stop all U.S. military aid to Guatemala after the 
country misused armored vehicles that had been delivered to the 
country to address drug trafficking.21 
2. Honduras 
Honduras is a Central American country with a population 
of 9.1 million people.22  The country has enjoyed close relations 
with the U.S., and even served as a U.S. military base in the 
1980s.23  Honduras already had a significant trading 
relationship with the U.S. prior to CAFTA-DR, and the 
agreement has bolstered this trade relationship.24  Despite this 
history, Honduras has recently been beset by instability and a 
wave of Honduras citizens seeking asylum status in the U.S., 
which signals a need to improve the living conditions in the 
country.25 
3. Nicaragua 
Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries in the region and 
has been subject to civil war and dictatorship.26  However, 
beginning in the 1990s, Nicaragua began taking strides toward 
democracy.27  Attempts at promoting democracy have not 
eradicated the country’s significant poverty.28  Like other 
Central American countries, the U.S. provides bilateral aid to 
Nicaragua.  For example, in the 2008 fiscal year, Nicaragua 
received $28.6 million in assistance from the U.S., a figure that 
has trended upward.29 
 
                                                          
20   TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5 (Summary) (“Congress rejected much of 
those cuts in the reports to and language in the Consolidated Appropriations 
Acts of 2018 (P.L. 115-141), and 2019 (P.L. 116-6).”).  
21  TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5, at 19–20. 
22  MEYER, supra note 4, at 2.  
23  MEYER, supra note 4 (Summary). 
24  MEYER, supra note 4, at 11. 
25  MEYER, supra note 4 (Summary). 
26  CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22836, NICARAGUA: 
POLITICAL SITUATION AND U.S. RELATIONS (Summary) (2008). 
27  SEELKE, supra note 26, at 1. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. at 3. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/3
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The U.S. has demonstrated its support of Nicaragua in other 
capacities, such as promoting democracy and good governance 
practices.  The U.S. has backed recent democratic leaders in the 
country, including Daniel Ortega, a former Sandinista official 
(despite concerns regarding his authoritarian proclivities and 
ties to Iran and Venezuela).30  The U.S. has also worked with 
Nicaragua to reduce its crime rates and drug trafficking.31 
4. Costa Rica 
Costa Rica is a nation in Central America with a population 
of 5.1 million people.32  The country has traditionally been 
economically and politically stable.33  As a result of this stability, 
it has been a key partner to the U.S. in promoting democracy in 
Central America and elsewhere.34  In 2018, two-way trade 
between the U.S. and Costa Rica measured $11.2 billion, with 
U.S. exports equaling $6.3 billion, and Costa Rica exports 
equaling $4.9 billion.35  This means that the U.S. has enjoyed a 
trade surplus of $1.5 billion with Costa Rica.36  Trade with the 
U.S. accounted for over 41% of the country’s total trade in 2018.37  
The U.S. primarily exports medical equipment, plastics, 
machinery, and refined oil products to Costa Rica.38  Costa Rica 
primarily exports fruit, coffee, rubber, and medical equipment to 
the U.S.39  In 2017, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
determined that U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Costa 
Rica totaled $1.6 billion.40  Of this figure, 86% of FDI came from 
the manufacturing sector.41 
                                                          
30  SEELKE, supra note 26 (Summary). 
31  SEELKE, supra note 26, at 5.  
32  PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10908, COSTA RICA: AN 
OVERVIEW (2019). 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  MEYER, supra note 32. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
7
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5. El Salvador 
El Salvador was the first nation to ratify and implement 
CAFTA-DR.42  Despite its support for the trade agreement and 
openness of bilateral trade, El Salvador’s trade flows have 
lagged behind other CAFTA-DR nations.43  This trend is likely 
due to governance and public security issues, as well as 
insufficient investment in the country.44  Even though its trade 
has not matched that of other CAFTA-DR countries, the U.S. 
remains the top trading partner with El Salvador—in 2018, the 
U.S. bought 44% of the items it exported.45  El Salvador 
primarily exports sugar, coffee, apparel, and equipment into the 
U.S., and in 2018, exported $2.5 billion into the U.S.46  The U.S. 
primarily exports plastics, cereals, electrical machinery, fuel oil, 
and nuclear parts to El Salvador, and in 2018, was valued at 
$3.4 billion.47  This means that the U.S. received approximately 
$888 million in trade surplus annually from its trade 
relationship with El Salvador.48 
6. Dominican Republic 
The Dominican Republic is a large Central American 
country located on Hispaniola, which is an island in the 
Caribbean.49  The Dominican Republic has traditionally been 
considered to be important to the U.S. policy interests.50  In 
2017, two-way trade between the U.S. and the Dominican 
Republic amounted to over $12.5 billion, up from $9.8 billion 
prior to CAFTA-DR.51  In 2017, the U.S. enjoyed a $3 billion 
trade surplus with the Dominican Republic.52  However, foreign 
traders of counterfeit and illicit goods also find a ready market 
                                                          
42  CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43616, EL SALVADOR: 
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 27 (2019).  
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
48  SEELKE, supra note 42.  
49  CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF 10407, DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC (2018).  
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Id.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/3
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in the country.  In its 2017 Special 301 Report, the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) determined that 
the Dominican Republic has failed to prosecute persons selling 
counterfeit goods, which remain readily available in the 
country.53 
 
The U.S. has supported the Dominican Republic in its 
efforts to address health and security concerns.54  The U.S. 
Department of Labor also tracks the Dominican Republic’s 
efforts to minimize child labor.55  Despite earlier efforts, the 
Trump Administration has recently suggested it will reduce aid 
efforts in the region, as it has in other foreign nations.56 
B. What is CAFTA-DR? 
The Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade 
Agreement, frequently abbreviated as CAFTA-DR, constitutes 
the first free trade agreement entered into by the U.S. with six 
Central American countries described above—Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and 
Costa Rica.57  CAFTA-DR was enacted to improve relations and 
promote openness of trade between these nations and the U.S.58  
CAFTA-DR’s impact has been significant—the combined six 
countries constitute the 18th largest trading partner with the 
U.S., measuring two way flows of goods valued at $57.4 billion 
in 2018.59  Of this figure, the U.S. exported $32.2 billion into 
CAFTA-DR countries and $25.2 billion was exported into the 
U.S. by the same countries.60  This resulted in a trade surplus of 
$7 billion—meaning that U.S. exporters benefited from trading 
with CAFTA-DR countries.61  The U.S. Department of 
Commerce has estimated that CAFTA-DR has created or 
supported approximately 134,000 American jobs.62  CAFTA-DR 
                                                          
53  Id. 
54  Id.  
55  SEELKE, supra note 49. 
56  Id. 
57  USTR, supra note 2.  
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
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has also promoted labor conditions in the six nations through 
various mechanisms that enforce the labor laws of each nation.63  
For example, Guatemala was subject to the first labor rights 
contest after it failed to allow its workers their rights guaranteed 
to them by the laws of Guatemala.64  The U.S. has provided 
assistance to promote labor rights in Guatemala to ameliorate 
some of the burden on Guatemala to rectify labor conditions; 
despite U.S. aid, living conditions in the country generally 
remain poor.65 
 
Proponents of CAFTA-DR have argued that the trade 
agreement promotes regional stability and economic growth.66  
CAFTA-DR has also promoted transparency, which increases 
investors’ proclivity to invest in these countries.67  A stable 
economy, in turn, improves communities and living conditions 
for local residents.68 
 
CAFTA-DR was implemented by each member nation 
separately,69 with El Salvador first, implementing the 
agreement on March 1, 2006, and Costa Rica last, implementing 
it on January 1, 2009.70  Pursuant to CAFTA-DR, most goods of 
these nations may be imported into the U.S. duty-free and will 
not be subject to the merchandise processing fee (MPF).71  On 
January 1, 2025, the date which CAFTA-DR will be fully 
implemented, all goods imported under CAFTA-DR will not be 
encumbered by these restrictions.72 
                                                          
63  USTR, supra note 2.   
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CENTRAL AMERICA-DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA-DR) (2019), 
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr [hereinafter U.S. 
Customs and Border Prot.]. 
70  See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CAFTA-DR SUMMARY (2015), 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CAFTA%20Sum%20Page.p
df (providing CAFTA-DR’s implementation date for each country as: El 
Salvador: 3/1/06; Nicaragua: 4/1/06; Honduras: 4/1/06; Guatemala: 7/1/06; 
Dominican Republic: 3/1/07; and Costa Rica: 1/1/09). 
71  U.S. Customs and Border Prot., supra note 69. 
72  Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/3
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Negotiations relating to CAFTA-DR’s implementation 
started in January 2003,73 and CAFTA-DR was ultimately 
signed on August 5, 2004.74  On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Senate 
approved legislation implementing the agreement, and the U.S. 
House of Representatives followed suit on July 28, 2005.75  On 
August 2, 2005, President George W. Bush signed the agreement 
into effect.76  Subsequently, Central American countries 
approved the agreement.77 
 
CAFTA-DR was implemented pursuant to the U.S.-
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act.78  The Implementation Act enables 
CAFTA-DR to take effect as to those countries that have abided 
by CAFTA-DR’s requirements.79  Under Sections 201–203 of the 
Implementation Act, the President may create tariff 
modifications as well as rules of origin provisions for preferential 
tariff treatment with respect to goods provided for in the 
Agreement.80  El Salvador implemented CAFTA-DR pursuant to 
Presidential Proclamation 7987, with the agreement taking 
effect on March 1, 2006.81  Honduras and Nicaragua 
implemented CAFTA-DR pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 
7996, with the agreement taking effect on April 1, 2006.82 
 
CAFTA-DR is significant because it builds upon efforts to 
eliminate barriers to trade that were started by the 1983 
                                                          
73  M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & KATARINA DE LA ROSA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., IF10394, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA-DR) (2019).  
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  See id. (stating the dates of CAFTA-DR’s adoption as “El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala by July 1, 2006, the Dominican Republic 
on March 1, 2007, and Costa Rica on January 1, 2009.”). 
78  Memorandum from the Exec. Dir., Trade Enf’t and Facilitation Office 
of Field Operations, to the Dirs., Field Operations 1 (Apr. 26, 2006), 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/us_dominican.pdf (stating 
that the Implementation Act, codified in Public Law 109-53; 119 Stat. 462; 19 
U.S.C. 4001 note, was signed into law on August 2, 2005) [hereinafter Memo 
for Directors & Field Operations]. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 2.  
82  Id. 
11
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Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).83  CAFTA-DR also symbolizes 
the U.S.’s commitment to promoting security and democracy in 
Central America.84  Proponents of CAFTA-DR believe the 
agreement represents an increasing focus toward creating a 
regional approach to trade with Central American countries and 
supersedes prior unilateral trade agreements, including the 
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBPTA) and the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA).85  CAFTA-
DR additionally creates a binding agreement between the 
countries, replacing a series of trade preference agreements.86  
The increased flexibility afforded by the rules of origin 
provisions has promoted regional integration in Central 
America.87  CAFTA-DR has had a particular effect in stabilizing 
rules for the service sector, including investment and 
intellectual property.88  However, most imports from CAFTA-DR 
countries into the U.S. had been duty-free prior to CAFTA-DR, 
meaning that the enactment of CAFTA-DR has had a limited 
effect on the U.S. economy.89 
 
In particular, CAFTA-DR has promoted regional 
integration by harmonizing rules of origin and promoting 
market access.90  The reduction of market barriers has led to 
increased co-production and economies of scale.91  CAFTA-DR 
also installs reciprocal trade rules allowing for enhanced duty-
free treatment.92  For example, if fabric is made in the U.S. but 
the final clothing product is produced in Central America, then 
the final product would receive duty-free treatment upon return 
shipment to the U.S.93 
                                                          
83  VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73. 
84  Id. 
85  See id. (“Supporters also view the agreement as a way to reinforce 
economic stability and encourage regional economic integration.”). 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Id.  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/3
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C. Understanding CAFTA-DR’s Provisions. 
CAFTA-DR has twenty-two chapters, which include 
“provisions on tariff and nontariff barrier elimination, rules of 
origin, customs procedures, sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
measures, government procurement, investment, trade in 
services, intellectual property rights protection, labor, 
environment, and dispute settlement.”94 
1. General Rules of Origin 
The general rules of origin, which assist with determining 
whether a good may receive preferential tariff treatment, are 
laid out in Section 203 of the CAFTA-DR Implementation Act.95  
To determine the origin of a good under CAFTA-DR, GN29 
provides definitions and specific rules of origin to assist in 
making a determination.96  CAFTA-DR was drafted based upon 
similar rules of origin criteria as was used in a number of other 
trade agreements, including the Australia Free Trade 
Agreement and the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement.97  The 
burden is on the importer to substantiate a good’s origin.98  A 
non-textile good is deemed to have originated where it was 
obtained or produced entirely in one or more of the countries that 
abide by the CAFTA-DR, so long as each of the materials used 
in its production are classified pursuant to GN29(n), and the 
goods meet all other requirements; it also could be deemed to 
have originated where it was obtained or produced if the good is 
produced entirely in a country that abides by the CAFTA-DR 
and is created solely from originating materials from that 
country.99 
                                                          
94  Id. 
95  Memo for Directors & Field Operations, supra note 78, at 2.  
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 9. 
99  Id. at 2–3 (“Generally, under the CAFTA-DR, a non-textile good is 
originating where: (a) The good is wholly obtained or produced entirely in the 
territory of one or more of the Parties (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic or the U.S.); (b) The good is 
produced entirely in the territory of one or more of the Parties and (i) Each of 
the non-originating materials used in the production of the good undergoes an 
applicable charge in the tariff classification specified in GN29(n); or (ii) The 
good otherwise satisfies any applicable regional value content (RVC) specified 
in GN29(n); and the good satisfies all other applicable requirements; or (c) The 
13
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Most goods, except those enumerated in GN29, are subject 
to a de minimis provision of 10 percent.100  Textile goods are 
subject to a separate de minimis provision outlined in 
GN29(d)(i).101  The de minimis rule provides that “a good that 
contains materials that do not undergo a required change in 
tariff clarification (tariff shift) as specified in GN29(n), may still 
qualify as originating if the value of all non-originating 
materials, used in the production of the good, that do not 
undergo the required change in classification does not exceed 
10% of the adjusted value of the good.”102  Further, “[t]he de 
minimis provision applies provided that the value of such non-
originating materials will be included in the total value of non-
originating materials for any applicable RVC requirement.”103  
Certain exceptions to the de minimis provision are located in 
GN29(e)(ii) of the HTS.104 
2. Customs Administration 
After a rule of origin determination is made, customs must 
be administered.  CAFTA-DR is drafted so that goods can clear 
customs quickly.105  Customs officials are required to release 
goods meeting customs requirements within forty-eight hours of 
arrival; they must release goods at their point of arrival without 
sending such goods to a storage facility first; and they must 
allow goods to be withdrawn by importers at any point before a 
final fee decision is rendered.106  Express shipments must be 
approved within six hours after the shipment has reached an 
entry point and all appropriate documentation is provided.107  
CAFTA-DR has a number of provisions designed to bolster 
transparency during customs administration.108  CAFTA-DR 
countries must openly publish their customs law and relevant 
                                                          
good is produced entirely in the territory of one or more of the Parties 
exclusively from originating materials.”). 
100  Id. at 3. 
101  Memo for Directors & Field Operations, supra note 78, at 3. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  Lisa A. Crosby & Michael J. Smart, CAFTA: New Rules, New 
Opportunities, 12 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 41, 41 (2006).  
106  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 5.2. 
107  Id. art. 5.7(e).  
108  Id. art. 5.1. 
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regulations; must accept questions regarding customs issues;109 
must publish any proposed customs regulations and allow for 
public comment prior to adoption;110 must provide tariff rules 
and classifications in an advance writing;111 and must ensure 
that importers can have customs decisions reviewed by an 
independent judicial body.112  CAFTA-DR also requires that 
customs information remain confidential.113 
3. Legal Protections for Investors 
CAFTA-DR enhances protections for investors within 
CAFTA-DR member countries.  In particular, CAFTA-DR 
guarantees non-discriminatory treatment to investors and 
requires “no less favorable” treatment to the investors of any 
CAFTA-DR member country.114  CAFTA-DR also affords the 
right to repatriate profits and make other capital transfers 
relating to an investment;115 protects against expropriation 
without prompt, adequate, and effective compensation;116 and 
guarantees fair and equitable treatment as well as full 
protection and security of their investments.117 
 
Under CAFTA-DR, an investment is broadly defined to 
include a number of intangible and tangible assets; including: 
commercial enterprises, stocks, equity, bonds, shares, 
debentures, options or other derivatives, futures, intellectual 
property, licenses and permits, movable or immovable property, 
contracts, and other property including leases, liens, and 
mortgages.118 
 
As will be discussed in the following section, CAFTA-DR 
promotes investment from U.S. investors by ensuring the 
                                                          
109  Id. art. 5.1(1). 
110  Id. art. 5.1(3). 
111  Id. art. 5.5. 
112  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 5.8. 
113  Id. art. 5.4.  
114  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts. 10.3, 10.4. 
115  Id. art. 10.8. 
116  Id. art. 10.7. 
117  Id. art. 10.5. 
118  Id. art. 10.28; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, at 43.  
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availability of arbitration for investor-state disputes.119  The 
investor and state may initially engage in communications 
regarding the dispute, but if such negotiations fail, then CAFTA-
DR guarantees that a panel of three arbitrators—one arbitrator 
selected by each party and a third arbitrator selected pursuant 
to the agreement—may decide the dispute.120  The arbitral panel 
has the authority to award restitution, money damages, 
attorney’s fees, and other costs.121 
 
CAFTA-DR enhances protections for cross-border service 
suppliers.  CAFTA-DR guarantees that service suppliers will 
receive “treatment no less favourable than [a nation] accords to 
its own service suppliers or service suppliers from any third 
country.”122  Cross-border service suppliers also cannot be 
required to establish a local presence in a region prior to 
providing services.123  CAFTA-DR creates exceptions to the 
foregoing rules due to specific economic needs of each CAFTA-
DR member country.124 
 
CAFTA-DR guarantees that U.S. banks and financial 
institutions will not be discriminated against when they 
establish, expand, operate, or sell their investments in CAFTA-
DR countries.125  U.S. financial institutions also may not be 
discriminated against when providing specific services, such as 
“maritime shipping and commercial aviation insurance, 
reinsurance and financial advisory services, such as investment 
advice and advice on mergers and acquisitions.”126  Finally, U.S. 
financial institutions cannot be discriminated against when 
                                                          
119  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts. 10.15–10.27; Crosby & Smart, supra 
note 105, at 43. 
120  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts 10.15, 10.16, 10.19. 
121  Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, at 43. 
122  Id. at 43–44; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts. 11.2, 11.3. 
123  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 11.5; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, 
at 44. 
124  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 11.6; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, 
at 44. 
125  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 12.2; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, 
at 44. 
126  Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, at 44; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 
12.5. 
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providing portfolio management services.127 
4. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
CAFTA-DR has a dispute settlement mechanism in place for 
when one party believes that the agreement’s terms are not 
being properly implemented, thus preventing that party from 
receiving benefits it believes it should receive.128  The first step 
in the dispute settlement process is for the parties to consult 
with the Free Trade Commission for mediation.129  If this step 
fails, the parties may then seek the assistance of arbitration.130  
Upon review of the case, the arbitral panel will issue a report 
with its determination of the matter and may make 
recommendations—if the disputing Parties requests them—as 
to how the dispute may be resolved.131  This report will dictate 
how the dispute should be resolved.132  If disputing parties are 
unable to reach an agreement as to how the dispute should be 
resolved, the parties will be required to negotiate an acceptable 
compensation amount.133  If a compensation amount cannot be 
agreed upon, then the aggrieved party may seek trade 
sanctions.134 
 
CAFTA-DR expands upon the WTO’s dispute mechanism.135  
                                                          
127  Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, at 44; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 
12.9(2). 
128  Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, at 44; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts. 
20.2, annex 20.2. 
129  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.5; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, 
at 44. 
130  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.6; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, 
at 44. 
131  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.13; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, 
at 44. 
132  See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.15 (describing the process once 
a final report is received as “[o]n receipt of the final report of a panel, the 
disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally 
shall conform with the determinations and recommendations, if any, of the 
panel.”).  
133  Id. art. 20.16. 
134  See id. 20.16(2) (describing the process of giving notice to issue 
sanctions as “any such complaining Party may at any time thereafter provide 
written notice to the Party complained against that it intends to suspend the 
application to the Party complained against of benefits of equivalent effect.”).  
135  Id. art. 20.3(1) (“Where a dispute regarding any matter arises under 
this Agreement and under another free trade agreement to which the disputing 
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CAFTA-DR is unique in that it provides parties with 
opportunities to consult on measures before they are required to 
adhere to the final agreement.136  The intention behind allowing 
consultation prior to becoming part of the final agreement was 
to provide foreign investors with the ability to state their 
position before a measure was adopted, thereby easing certain 
concerns held by foreign investors in the event of a dispute.137 
 
Signatory countries are also provided the right to state their 
position as to how the agreement should be interpreted or 
applied during another party’s adjudicatory proceedings.138  An 
aggrieved party must choose between CAFTA-DR or the WTO’s 
dispute resolution procedures.139  To prevent parties from 
seeking judicial assistance in both forums, a forum selection 
clause requires the selection of a forum.140 
 
CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 10—which houses the agreement’s 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism—is created in the 
shadow of NAFTA’s Chapter 11.141  Currently, five investor-state 
arbitrations have been brought pursuant to CAFTA-DR 
disputes: “(1) Railroad Development Corp. v. Guatemala (2007); 
(2) TCW Group Inc. v. Dominican Republic (2007); (3) Pacific 
Rim Cayman v. El Salvador (2008); (4) TECO Energy Inc. v. 
Guatemala (2009); and (5) Commerce Group Corp. and San 
Sebastian Gold Mines Inc. v. El Salvador (2009).”142  Each of 
                                                          
Parties are party or the WTO Agreement, the complaining Party may select 
the forum in which to settle the dispute.”). 
136  Id. art. 20.4(1) (“Any Party may request in writing consultations with 
any other Party with respect to any actual or proposed measure or any other 
matter that it considers might affect the operation of this Agreement.”). 
137  See id. art. 10.15 (“In the event of an investment dispute, the claimant 
and the respondent should initially seek to resolve the dispute through 
consultation and negotiation, which may include the use of non-binding, third-
party procedures such as conciliation and mediation.”).  
138  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.20. 
139  Id. art. 20.3(1). 
140  Id. art. 20.3(2) (“Once the complaining Party has requested a panel 
under an agreement referred to in paragraph 1, the forum selected shall be 
used to the exclusion of the others.”).  
141  See Daniel E. González et al., Investment-Related Legal Documents in 
Central America. and the Dominican Republic, in 76 INT’L J. ARB., MEDIATION 
& DISP. MGMT. 70 (2010) (discussing investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms). 
142  Id. (alteration in original).  
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/3
2019 PROPOSALS FOR MODERNIZING CAFTA-DR 121 
these arbitrations are related to natural resources and 
infrastructure development disputes.143  Chapter 10’s 
investment provisions are not retroactive.144  Thus, foreign 
investors may only contest government actions arising after 
CAFTA-DR took effect.145 
 
CAFTA-DR has been particularly effective in enabling 
foreign investors to assist with meeting Central America’s 
natural resource and infrastructure needs.146  CAFTA-DR has 
increased foreign investment relating to natural resource 
manufacturing, including metal mining and extractive 
industries.147  The Inter-American Development Bank has 
provided additional assistance in helping foreign investors 
develop infrastructure projects in Central America, and in 
January 2009, provided a $60 million loan for the Central 
American Mezzanine Infrastructure Fund (CAMIF).148  CAMIF 
seeks to increase its available loan assistance to $150 million 
over time.149 
 
Under CAFTA-DR, U.S. investors may also begin an 
arbitration pursuant to the ICSID Convention.150  Only the 
Dominican Republic is not a member of the ICSID 
Convention.151  The advantages of utilizing ICSID include that 
the forum has established investor-state case law and enacted 
procedural rules.152  Furthermore, ICSID is located in 
Washington, D.C., which may be a more convenient location for 
U.S. investors.153  ICSID has already proven important to 
resolving disputes under CAFTA-DR, with three of the five 
                                                          
143  Id. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. at 72. 
147  González et al., supra note 141, at 72. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. at 75; see also CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.16(3) (providing 
that “a claimant may submit a claim . . . (a) under the ICSID Convention . . . 
(b) under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules . . . or (c) under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.”). 
151  González et al., supra note 141, at 76. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. 
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disputes having been adjudicated in this forum.154 
 
CAFTA-DR includes a fee-shifting provision, which permits 
the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party if a frivolous 
action is brought against that party.155  This fee-shifting 
provision was created to deter a financially-strapped CAFTA-DR 
country from “pro forma challenging the jurisdiction of an 
investor’s claim.”156  Because such jurisdictional objections 
frequently only delay arbitration proceedings, such provisions 
will reduce unnecessary time and expense associated with 
arbitration.157  The fee-shifting provision likely means that 
CAFTA-DR respondent nations will be less likely to file 
jurisdictional objections to an investor’s claims.158 
 
CAFTA-DR Chapter 10 employs a U.S. definition of indirect 
expropriation.159  Pursuant to Annex 10-C(4), indirect 
expropriation it is defined as: 
 
[A]n action . . . by a Party [that] has an effect equivalent to direct 
expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright 
seizure . . .  and requires [that a reviewing arbitral panel conduct] 
a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other 
factors: (i) the economic impact of the government action . . . (ii) 
the extent to which the government actions interferes with 
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the 
character of the government action.160 
 
                                                          
154  Id. 
155  Id.; see also CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art.10.20(6) (“When it decides 
a respondent’s objection . . . [to jurisdiction], the tribunal may, if warranted, 
award to the prevailing disputing party reasonable costs and attorney’s fees 
incurred in submitting or opposing the objection.  In determining whether such 
an award is warranted, the tribunal shall consider whether either the 
claimant’s claim or the respondent’s objection was frivolous . . . .”). 
156  González et al., supra note 141, at 76.  
157  Id. 
158  Id. at 77; see also R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Guatemala, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/23 (2007) (rejecting Respondent’s objection to jurisdiction based on the 
validity of the Claimant’s waivers of right to initiate).   
159 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, annex 10-C; González et al., supra note 141, 
at 77.  
160  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, annex 10-C; González et al., supra note 141, 
at 77.  
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This three-pronged test is derived from U.S. law—it is 
modeled after the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark standard set 
forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.161  
The intention behind modeling the indirect expropriation 
standard after U.S. law is so that U.S. investors receive the same 
protections investing in CAFTA-DR countries as they would be 
afforded had they invested domestically.162 
 
The CAFTA-DR standard provides a clearer interpretation 
as to which type of acts can constitute indirect expropriation, 
thus reducing uncertainty between investors.163  By contrast, 
NAFTA Chapter 11 employs a more ambiguous “tantamount to 
expropriation” standard.164  However, it is important to note that 
arbitration tribunals have not yet regularly interpreted the 
Penn Central indirect expropriation standard, so any differences 
between the CAFTA-DR and NAFTA indirect expropriation 
standards remain to be seen.165 
II. ANALYSIS 
CAFTA-DR has been a boon to Central American trade—
increasing overall trade and foreign direct investment flows; 
trade composition has also shifted favorably.166  CAFTA-DR fits 
within the broader international trade landscape, which is 
shifting towards trade regionalization.167  CAFTA-DR has 
strengthened regional integration where multilateral trade 
agreements have failed, though limitations associated with 
regional trade agreements remain.168  To a lesser extent, 
                                                          
161  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y, 438 U.S. 104, 123–125 
(1978) (holding that to determine if a regulatory action that diminishes the 
value of a Claimant’s property constitutes a “taking” of that property, the court 
must consider the economic impact of the regulation on the Claimant, the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the governmental action); see also González 
et al., supra note 141, at 77 (stating the factor to determine where an action 
constitutes an indirect expropriation).  
162  González et al., supra note 141, at 77. 
163  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, annex 10-C.  
164  González et al., supra note 141, at 76.  
165  Id. 
166  VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73. 
167  Id. 
168  Id. 
21
124 PACE INT’L L. REV. Vol. 32:1 
CAFTA-DR has promoted social change, such as improving 
working conditions for laborers.  However, living and working 
conditions for many, perhaps the majority, persons in Central 
America remain poor.169  Each of the foregoing trends will be 
discussed in turn. 
A. CAFTA-DR has Increased Bilateral Trade Flows and has 
Altered Trade Composition. 
CAFTA-DR has increased trade flows and has altered trade 
composition.  The U.S. has traditionally been the top trading 
partner with CAFTA-DR nations, though the U.S.’ prominence 
has recently decreased somewhat.170  In 2018, CAFTA-DR 
nations exported 45% of their total exports to the U.S.; 39% of 
the goods imported into these countries were imported from the 
U.S.171  After CAFTA-DR’s passage, U.S. exports to CAFTA-DR 
countries have increased at a faster rate than imports from 
CAFTA-DR countries into the U.S.172  Since CAFTA-DR took 
effect, bilateral trade flows, originating from both CAFTA-DR 
countries and the U.S., have grown in the aggregate.173 
 
Coupled with increased overall trade, trade composition has 
shifted since CAFTA-DR took effect—CAFTA-DR nations have 
increasingly exported more expensive and sophisticated goods, 
such as semiconductors and medical equipment, while 
traditional exports, such as apparel and textile, have waned.174 
 
In 2018, the U.S.’s exports into CAFTA-DR countries 
consisted of “petroleum and coal products (22%); fibers, yarns 
and threads (5%); oilseeds and grains (5%); resin and synthetic 
rubber products (3%); and communications equipment (3%).”175  
The U.S. has imported from CAFTA-DR countries a variety of 
goods, including “apparel (32%); fruits and tree nuts (13%); 
medical equipment and supplies (11%); motor vehicle parts (5%); 
                                                          
169  Id. 
170  Id. 
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tobacco products (4%); and electrical equipment (1%).”176 
 
CAFTA-DR has reduced the tariff rates on goods from 8.5% 
in 2006 to 1.9% in 2010.177  This resulted in an increase in 
imports from the U.S. and elsewhere (including China, Mexico, 
and Venezuela) into the Dominican Republic.178  China sent a 
variety of manufactured goods, such as footwear, equipment, 
and electronics into the country.179  Venezuela largely imported 
oil, and Mexico imported electronics and oil.180  In 2011, 
Dominican Republic received 10% of its imports from China, 
6.9% from Venezuela, and 6.1% from Mexico.181 
B. CAFTA-DR has Increased Foreign Direct Investment. 
CAFTA-DR has increased foreign direct investment flows, 
which depicts the amount of foreign investment flowing into the 
country.182  Foreign direct investment flows generally bear a 
close relationship to free trade agreements.183  Free trade 
agreements can promote foreign investment by protecting 
foreign investors and stabilizing market access.184  U.S. 
investors have traditionally been the top investors in CAFTA-
DR nations, though underlying macroeconomic conditions make 
it difficult to determine the exact magnitude of this investment 
and how CAFTA-DR’s safeguards have affected these trends.185  
Most foreign direct investment in Central America relates to the 
services sector.186  In 2018, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, 
and Costa Rica had the highest FDI flows originating from the 
U.S.187  In particular, Costa Rica and Dominican Republic’s FDI 
flows may be attributed to the nations’ economic and political 
                                                          
176  Id. 
177  Chad P. Bown & Mark Wu, Safeguards and the Perils of Preferential 
Trade Agreements: Dominican Republic–Safeguard Measures, 13 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 179, 187 (2014). 
178  Id. 
179  Id. at 188.  
180  Id. 
181  Id. 
182  VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
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stability, as well as high productivity levels in these nations.188 
C. CAFTA-DR has Promoted Labor Rights, but More Remains 
to be Done. 
CAFTA-DR was one of the earliest trade agreements to 
particularly incorporate labor capacity building provisions.189  
Under CAFTA-DR, a country must “not fail to effectively enforce 
its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action 
or inaction, in a manner affecting trade.”190  Monetary penalties 
are capped in labor disputes.191  A labor cooperation mechanism, 
labor affairs council, and labor capacity building device all assist 
with implementing labor commitments under CAFTA-DR.192 
 
Labor rights under CAFTA-DR have been a particular point 
of contention.  Several key issues have arisen, including whether 
CAFTA-DR countries had promulgated laws in accordance with 
the principles set forth by the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), and whether countries were adequately able to enforce 
such laws.193  Leaders in CAFTA-DR countries have recognized 
that they lack adequate financial resources.194  Avenues for 
improving working conditions remain a key concern.195  Further, 
in three instances, the U.S. has taken action after finding that 
Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic did not 
abide by their promises relating to working conditions.196  In 
each instance, the U.S. attempted to engage with the offending 
country and devise a labor plan to rectify the labor violation.197  
Despite these efforts, tangible improvements in working 
conditions have been slow and uneven.198 
 
For example, in April 2008, the American Federation of 
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189  Id. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. 
192  Id. 
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Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and 
six labor unions based in Guatemala launched a complaint 
asserting that Guatemala had not adequately enforced its labor 
laws by failing to provide appropriate working conditions and 
had impinged upon workers’ rights to bargain, organize, and 
associate with others.199  In January 2009, an OTLA report was 
published summarizing these findings.200  In 2010, the U.S., 
finding that Guatemala had “‘not undertaken effective steps to 
correct systemic failures’ in labor law enforcement,” began 
consulting with the country.201  After these consultations did not 
yield meaningful change, the U.S. had an arbitral panel 
installed in August 2011.202 
 
In April 2013, Guatemala and the U.S. entered into a labor 
enforcement agreement with eighteen points of improvement.203  
However, Guatemala was unable to meet the terms of the labor 
enforcement agreement, and the dispute was arbitrated from 
2014 to 2017.204  Ultimately, the arbitral panel sided with 
Guatemala, finding that “while Guatemala failed to enforce 
certain laws, the evidence did not provide it was ‘sustained or 
recurring’ and ‘in a manner affecting trade,’ and thus did not 
violate FTA provisions.”205 
 
The WTO rules do not include labor standards, while the 
ILO is generally the formal body that oversees labor issues.206  
Due to the lack of labor protections pursuant to WTO rules, 
many free trade agreements specifically include labor 
provisions.207  For example, the U.S. requires that workers be 
given specific rights in exchange for Central American and other 
developing countries to receive particular trade benefits.208  
Trade agreements entered into by the U.S. and developing 
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ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN U.S. FTAS (2019). 
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202  Id. 
203  Id. 
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205  CIMINO-ISAACS, supra note 199 (alteration in original).  
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nations have been particularly noted for their emphasis on labor 
rights.209  This trend has also increased labor provisions in trade 
agreements across the world, with a report by the ILO finding 
that “as of 2016, 77 out of 267 FTAs globally included labor 
provisions, compared to 21 to 2005.”210  Labor provisions found 
in trade agreements not entered into by the U.S. differ from 
those by the U.S. because dispute settlement for labor provisions 
is generally not required in non-U.S. trade agreements.211  Most 
of these labor provisions employ a collaborative approach that 
promote capacity building, monitoring, and discussions with the 
offending nation.212  Rather than impose trade sanctions upon 
the offending country, a cooperative approach is generally 
sought.213 
D. The Failed TPP and Lessons Learned. 
At one time, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) was thought to be the future of trade, and 
many CAFTA-DR countries had demonstrated an interest in 
signing the TPP had it taken effect.214  Although the TPP never 
took effect (and is unlikely to ever do so), this willingness 
suggests that new possibilities exist to further bolster the trade 
relationship between the U.S. and Central America.215  One way 
to benefit from this enhanced relationship would be to expand 
the harmonized rules of origin with other Central American 
nations that are not CAFTA-DR members and to look for 
avenues to bolster co-production.216  The U.S. could also work 
with Central American countries to shape its existing trade 
facilitation agenda to further enhance shared goals.217  Through 
these efforts, Central American countries and the U.S. can 
further facilitate economic growth in the region.218  Finally, the 
U.S. could engage in increased formal or informal discussions 
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with Central American countries and solicit their opinions on 
mechanisms to promote trade and use these recommendations 
to create a multinational strategy.219 
E. How CAFTA-DR and Other Regional Trade Agreements 
have Assisted where Multilateral Negotiations have Fallen 
Short. 
Before 2000, multilateral negotiations were the 
predominant mechanism for trade negotiations.220  The 
increased use of trade agreements resulted from the failure of 
the 1999 Seattle Ministerial and the 2003 Cancún Ministerial to 
achieve a trade consensus.221  Since multilateral negotiations 
have often failed, WTO members have increasingly looked to 
regional trade agreements to fill these gaps.222  Regionalization 
of trade agreements can be attributed, in part, to the break-up 
of the Soviet Union and instability in Eastern Europe.223 
 
The 1999 Seattle Ministerial served as a turning point for 
support of regional trade agreements.224  Most countries now 
negotiate a variety of regional trade agreements to incorporate 
issues relevant to a particular region.225  Moreover, those nations 
that did not have regional trade agreements in place before 1999 
have increasingly begun to enter into such agreements.226 
 
Depictive of this trend, prior to 1999, the U.S. only had 
                                                          
219  Id. 
220  Bryan Mercurio, The WTO and Its Institutional Impediments, 8 
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 198, 217 (2007). 
221  Id.; see also Jo-Ann Crawford & Roberto V. Fiorentino, The Changing 
Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements 16 (World Trade Org., Working 
Paper No. 8, 2005) (discussing the motivations for the increased use of regional 
trade agreements).  
222  Crawford & Fiorentino, supra note 221, at 5–6. 
223  Id. at 6; see also Mercurio, supra note 220, at 218 (finding the 
development of thirteen goods agreements and eleven agreements covering 
trade in the 1990s unsurprising due to the break-up of the Soviet Union).  
224  Mercurio, supra note 220, at 217.   
225  Id.; see also John Whalley, Recent Regional Agreements: Why So Many, 
Who So Much Variance in Form, Why Coming So Far, and Where Are They 
Headed?, 31 WORLD ECON., 517, 519–21 (2008) (finding that nations such as the 
United States and Canada have made efforts to go regional with one another).   
226  Whalley, supra note 225, at 520–21; Mercurio, supra note 220, at 218–
21. 
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entered into regional trade agreements with Israel, Mexico, and 
Canada.227  After 1999, the U.S. entered into regional trade 
agreements with a number of countries, including “Australia, 
Bahrain, Chile, CAFTA-DR (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), Jordan, 
Morocco, Oman, and Singapore.”228 
 
The shift away from multilateral trade agreements confers 
certain benefits.229  Because regional trade agreements are only 
entered into between smaller groups of countries, they can be 
entered into more efficiently and allow for good-faith discussions 
during the negotiation process.230  This also means that regional 
trade agreements may be more effective than multilateral trade 
agreements in increasing market access, reducing non-tariff 
barriers, promoting efficiency, and solidifying shared 
commitments.231  Regional trade agreements may also build 
support for issues, such as environmental, labor, and investment 
policies, that do not yet have multilateral support.232  They can 
also include heightened threshold protections for enforcement 
standards and other rights.233  Further, these agreements can 
assist nations in diversifying their trade portfolios and 
promoting a competitive advantage through economies of 
scale.234  Finally, regional trade agreements can promote 
regional economic and political security.235 
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However, regional trade agreements are characterized by 
certain drawbacks.236  First, those nations that are not members 
of the regional trade agreement are placed at a disadvantage 
when they seek to trade with member nations.237  Second, 
concerns have arisen that regional trade agreements could affect 
the WTO’s authority to oversee international trade.238  Regional 
trade agreements may also promote market access and reduce 
tariff rates, promoting trade inefficiencies, when a more efficient 
trading partner would otherwise be selected.239  More efficient or 
less expensive producers of the same good in a non-member 
country would thus lose out on trading opportunities.240  
Further, the increase in regional trade agreements may also 
promote confusion—a number of regional trade agreements 
could conflict or be otherwise inconsistent with the rule set forth 
in another trade agreement, leading to confusion and trade 
insecurity.241  Regional trade agreements also have not proven 
sufficient to address larger-scale trading issues, such as 
installing appropriate trading remedies and imposing fishery 
subsidies in shared waters.242  Additionally, regional trade 
agreements may reduce developing countries’ ability to create 
coalitions to influence trading policies set forth by stronger 
nations.243  Finally, regional trade agreements have largely been 
ineffective in coalition building.244 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Because CAFTA-DR has greatly benefited Central 
American trade and has created a trade surplus in the U.S., it 
can readily be modernized for the next generation of Central 
American trade, so long as bilateral support is achieved.245  
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Certain key considerations should be incorporated into 
upcoming revisions to CAFTA-DR.  First, continued emphasis 
should be placed on monitoring and policing labor rights 
violations.  Second, new provisions can be installed to address 
environmental externalities associated with increased 
development in Central America.  Third, CAFTA-DR can be 
modernized to assist with coalition building and other goals that 
multilateral trade agreements previously sought to address.  
Western nations can also use CAFTA-DR to further trade 
capacity building and economic growth in Central America.  
Finally, safeguards for investors should be improved to promote 
economic growth even if the region shows signs of instability. 
A. Continue Emphasis on Monitoring and Policing Labor 
Rights Violations. 
As described above, the living and working conditions in a 
number of Central American nations remain significantly worse 
than those conditions in their developed counterparts.  As 
depicted in the Guatemala arbitration, the creation of these poor 
living and working standards has, for the most part, not been 
caused by willful behaviors by the Guatemalan government nor 
by the local employers.246  Consequently, imposing sanctions or 
any other penalty on CAFTA-DR nations for violating labor 
rights standards is not likely to be effective.  Instead, a policy of 
providing assistance to these nations should be employed.  For 
example, large scale foreign investors could receive incentives—
such as U.S. tax breaks or other fiscal incentives—if they provide 
particular wages or working conditions to their workers.  
Improving workers’ rights is good business practice and is likely 
to be the most effective mechanism in improving labor conditions 
in Central America. 
B. Address Climate Change and Environmental Externalities. 
As CAFTA-DR countries increasingly develop and 
modernize, these countries are often unable to address the 
environmental externalities associated with their increased 
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growth.  Research has found that climate change can be 
particularly attributed to the rapid industrialization of 
developing nations.247  To this end, foreign investors should be 
required to adhere to stringent environmental regulations (such 
as those that would be found in the U.S.) during the development 
of large and small-scale projects within CAFTA-DR nations.  
Loan assistance from outside nations, NGOs, corporations, and 
other governments should also require that a small percentage 
of the funds be dedicated to environmental efforts and 
remediation. 
 
Even on a smaller scale, CAFTA-DR countries are often 
beset by local environmental issues, such as deforestation, soil 
erosion, and water and air pollution.248  Here too, foreign 
investors could be required to allocate a small portion of their 
project funds to address the environmental remediation and any 
possible environmental impacts associated with infrastructure 
projects or other developments for which their goods are 
subsequently used.  Small-scale foreign investors, as well as 
traders of finished goods for personal use, could receive U.S. and 
other tax breaks to dedicate to environmental assistance, 
especially where the trade of a good causes negative 
environmental impacts in Central America (such as refined oil, 
building materials, and other goods used for infrastructure 
development).  These efforts would introduce a collaborative 
approach to solve both large-scale and small-scale 
environmental issues affecting both local communities in 





                                                          
247  See IMF, Seeking Sustainable Growth: Short-Term Recovery, Long-
Term Challenges, World Economic Outlook (Oct. 2017) (explaining that 
developing countries often lack resources to address environmental issues 
associated with industrialization); see, e.g., Developing Countries Need Urgent 
Support to Adapt to Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://unfccc.int/news/developing-countries-need-urgent-support-to-adapt-to-
climate-change (explaining that developing countries often lack resources to 
address environmental issues associated with industrialization).  
248  Solbrig, supra note 6. 
31
134 PACE INT’L L. REV. Vol. 32:1 
C. Modernize CAFTA-DR’s Terms to Align with Multilateral 
Goals. 
As described, trade agreements have become increasingly 
regionalized, replacing prior efforts at multilateral 
agreements.249  While the demise of multilateral agreements has 
been associated with lack of coalition building and lack of 
unification, regional agreements, such as CAFTA-DR, provide 
an opportunity to enhance relationships with trading partners 
in new ways.  For example, increased regionalization of trade 
agreements opens up the opportunity for discussions between 
smaller groups of countries facing similar concerns—such as 
corruption, economic instability, environmental disasters, or 
severe poverty.250  These trade negotiations could place 
heightened emphasis on rectifying these issues and could enable 
a dialogue by which shared interests may be advanced.  The 
improved trading relationship between the U.S. and Central 
America could also create an opportunity for dialogue on other 
issues, such as corporate governance, increased minimum 
wages, access to health care, and leading social issues.  Through 
these efforts, Central American countries and the U.S. could 
further facilitate economic growth and promote living and 
working conditions in the region.251  This process—if designed 
more as an opportunity for increased bilateral dialogue, rather 
than formal trade negotiations—could promote trade while 
granting an occasion to address the shared goals that 
multilateral agreements once sought to address.252 
D. Promote Trade Capacity Building and Economic Growth in 
the Region. 
The U.S. already assists with trade capacity building in 
Central America, meaning it supports these nations with 
developing their internal industries for trade, as well as other 
avenues for economic growth.  Such efforts—typically in the 
form of loans or other financial assistance—have proven 
beneficial in promoting economic growth in Central America to 
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some extent.  However, prior efforts by the government of the 
U.S. and other nations to provide this assistance have fallen 
short.  Consequently, to further promote trade capacity building, 
CAFTA-DR could be modernized so that foreign investors play a 
heightened role in bringing new technologies and business 
concepts to Central America.  Foreign investors could also assist 
domestic companies in modernizing their inventory and 
operational strategies.  For example, as part of a trade deal, 
foreign investors could be required to provide a particular 
number of outreach and/or education hours, during which time 
these investors would provide instruction and guidance to more 
provincial businesses. 
 
There are already encouraging signs that trade capacity 
building efforts by the U.S. and other nations have been well-
received by CAFTA-DR nations.  Currently, each CAFTA-DR 
country has developed a “National Action Plan for Trade 
Capacity Building,” in which it identifies particular areas where 
outside assistance is needed to bolster trade and other aspects 
of economic growth.253  A number of international institutions, 
corporations, NGOs, as well as the U.S. government, provide 
assistance to meet these needs.254  However, increasing the role 
of Central American business leaders, who oversee locally the 
creation of goods for trade on both a large and small scale, may 
help improve the efficacy of these efforts and promote self-
determination of national trade policies in these countries. 
E. Improve Safeguards for Investors. 
As CAFTA-DR is modernized, safeguards for investors 
should be improved.  Due to continued economic and political 
instability in many Central American nations, many foreign 
investors remain uneasy about investing in CAFTA-DR 
countries.  Further, arbitration is often cumbersome and slow, 
leading investors to choose to invest in a more stable nation 
where such a forum may be perceived as less likely to be needed.  
Although CAFTA-DR allows for negotiations and consultations 
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prior to seeking arbitration, such efforts should be reinforced.  In 
particular, a timeline for resolution of the dispute should be 
imposed, and a timeline for expected relief or compensation 
should be mandated. 
 
Additionally, when arbitration tribunals are interpreting 
“indirect expropriation” provisions, foreign investors should be 
allowed to introduce the body of U.S. case law to assist in an 
interpretation of whether indirect expropriation has occurred to 
show that the investor’s reasonable interpretation of its rights 
were derived from this standard. 
 
Finally, increased emphasis should be placed upon 
developing relationships between foreign investors and loans set 
aside for economic and infrastructure development in large-scale 
projects.  For example, foreign investors may be able to increase 
imports of natural resources or manufacturing goods relating to 
a large-scale infrastructure project funded through 
international development aid in instances where the CAFTA-
DR nation does not have access to such resources domestically.  
Such imports would be profitable (because the CAFTA-DR 
country lacks a cost-effective substitute domestically) and would 
promote social and economic goals within the CAFTA-DR 
country, while simultaneously maintaining strong trade flows  
between the U.S. and Central America. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, CAFTA-DR changed Central American trade 
by reducing trade barriers and by promoting regional 
integration.  Heightened attention to social, political, and 
environmental issues, as well as new protections for 
technological innovation, will help to further bolster CAFTA-
DR’s ability to promote growth and improve living and working 
conditions in Central America. 
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